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Abstract
Security for online banking has changed considerably
during the relatively short period that online banking
has been in use. In particular, authentication and iden-
tity management in the early implementations were, and
sometimes still are, vulnerable to various attacks such as
phishing. Current state-of-the art solutions include meth-
ods for re-authenticating users via out-of-band channels
for each transaction. This paper describes a security in-
vestigation of this type of solution. The investigation con-
cludes that it protects against certain attacks while still
being vulnerable to other obvious attacks. In the near fu-
ture, it is expected that the remaining vulnerabilities will
be exploited as the attackers get more sophisticated. Pos-
sible ways of protecting against these future attacks are
outlined.
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1 Introduction
Identity management is normally interpreted as the man-
agement of users’ credentials and how they access a sys-
tem. Identity management systems can thus be seen as
consisting of an authentication part which is used to verify
the correctness of an entity’s claim to identity, and an ac-
cess control part which grants access to applications and
resources residing on a system or in a network. The au-
thentication and access control parts are often tightly inte-
grated.
With online services there are two types of authentica-
tions; user authentication and data origin authentication.
User authentication is the process of verifying the digital
identity of an entity. It is a way of ensuring that users are
who they claim to be when they access systems. On the
other hand, data origin authentication is to prove that the
source of data is as claimed. It is the verification that data
has not been tampered with in transit (data integrity) and
that it originated from the expected sender (authenticity).
In online banking, data origin authentication is impor-
tant. Although the user has logged on from a specific
client terminal and has been authenticated at the start of
a session, this in itself does not guarantee that every data
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packet originating from the client terminal is the inten-
tional result of user actions. For example, a Trojan1 ap-
plication could initiate online bank transactions from the
client terminal without the user’s consent or knowledge.
Data origin authentication can theoretically eliminate this
threat by authenticating the transaction request itself.
As a response to the growing threats to online bank-
ing security (such as phishing and fraud) and to enhance
the security, online bank systems usually implement spe-
cial methods for authentication. These methods allow the
authentication process at the transaction level by involv-
ing the user more in the security system having him/her
confirming every transaction. User authentication alone is
insufficient given the vulnerability of the standard client
terminal and the relatively high risk of online bank trans-
actions.
A typical method for data origin authentication is to
use an OTP (One-Time-Password) for each transaction.
Banks can implement this by issuing special hardware to-
kens that can generate one-time authorisation codes. An
OTP token is a password generator device with an LCD
screen which displays a pseudo-random number consist-
ing of 6 or more alphanumeric characters (Studies showed
that capacity of short term human memory load is nor-
mally 7 +/- 2 items (Miller 1956)). The pseudo-random
number changes when clicking a button on the token or at
a specific time interval such as every 30 or 60 seconds.
The device is synchronized with a peer OTP generator
on the service provider side and both tokens generate the
same sequence of numbers. The OTP must be copied man-
ually from the token to the client terminal.
Another method for data origin authentication used by
online bank systems is based on sending OTP with SMS
messages to the user’s mobile phone for each financial
transaction. As for the OTP token, the user must manually
copy the OTP from the mobile phone screen to the client
terminal in order to confirm each financial transaction.
The term ”authorization code” is often used by online
banks to denote the OTP, because it is required to ”autho-
rize” transactions. We will use this term instead of OTP
when discussing online bank security below.
A good identity management system should address
all identity management related aspects such as authen-
tication, authorization, privacy and usability (de Clercq &
Rouault 2004, Casassa Mont et al. 2002). This paper de-
scribes a practical experiment aimed at investigating the
security and usability of SMS-based data origin authenti-
cation for authorizing online banking transactions.
1A Trojan is a malicious software application that is not controlled by the owner
of the computer.
2 The SMS Authorization Scheme
2.1 Architecture
The main advantage of the SMS authorization scheme is
that SMS messages sent from the bank to the user’s mobile
phone pass through the cellular network, which is sepa-
rate and independent from the Internet. By verifying the
authorization code received from the client terminal, the
bank can conclude that the user received the SMS mes-
sage through the cellular network, read it and submitted
it through the Internet. This is then interpreted as a gen-
uine intent to submit the transaction. The security of this
scheme is based on the assumption that it is difficult for
an attacker to steal the user’s personal mobile phone and
to attack the cellular network (Jøsang et al. 2007a). The
scenario is illustrated in Fig.1 and Table 1.
Figure 1: Authorising bank transactions via SMS
Msg ♯ Message description
1 Produce Login Id and authentication token
2 Transmit Login Id and authentication token
3 Verify Login Id and authentication token
4 Transmit service options
5 Present service options
6 Transaction request
7 Transmit transaction request
8 SMS message with authorisation code
9 Read SMS message
10 Verify amount and bank account number
11 Copy authorisation code
12 Transmit authorisation code
13 Verify authorisation code
14 Transmit transaction confirmation
15 Present transaction confirmation
Table 1: Messages in SMS bank security protocol
The SMS authorisation code is computed as a func-
tion of the origin and destination accounts, as well as the
amount. It typically consists of a number of digits that can
be copied manually from the mobile phone to the client
terminal without too much effort. A typical SMS autho-
rization message is illustrated in Fig.2.
2.2 Security Analysis
When the authorization code is typed on the client termi-
nal and sent to the online bank, the transaction will be
executed. Assuming that an attacker changes the amount
and/or the destination account number, e.g. by a Trojan
program on the client terminal, the modified amount and
Figure 2: Example SMS message with authorisation code
account number will appear in the SMS message. It is as-
sumed that the correctness of the amount and of the desti-
nation account number is verified by the user when copy-
ing the authorisation code from the SMS message. If a
user victim fails to notice that the bank account number in
the SMS message is not the same as the intended account
number, and submits the authorisation code through the
client terminal, the attack will succeed.
Assuming that the user verifies the correctness of the
amount and of the bank account number in the SMS mes-
sage, this scheme is secure against attacks on the client
terminal, and is in fact independent of the security of the
client terminal. This represents a considerable security
improvement. It is possible to leverage the use of SMS
messages in this way because the amount of crucial data
is sufficiently small to be communicated in a single SMS
message.
This scheme assumes that the mobile terminal can be
trusted, i.e. that no attacker is able to take over the control
of a mobile terminal. This assumption can not be made
for the standard client terminal. If it were possible to
take over the control of the mobile terminal, an attacker
could change the SMS message, and present the expected
amount and the bank account number, so that the SMS
message that the user reads is not the same as the SMS
message that the bank sent.
The scheme depends to some degree on the security of
the mobile phone networks, and it assumes that no attacker
is able to modify SMS messages sent from the bank to
the user. Even if interception and cryptanalysis of SMS
messages sent over the air were possible, it requires that
the attacker is physically present in the same base station
coverage area, and this excludes attacks from anywhere in
the world.
However, SMS authentication schemes may be vulner-
able to delay and unreliable mobile SMS delivery. Avail-
ability is a fundamental security goal which means that
data and resources must be accessible when needed by an
authorized user. The SMS authentication scheme may vi-
olate the availability principle since SMS messages trav-
eling across different mobile networks may not arrive in a
timely fashion, causing service denial (Jiang 1998). The
problem is amplified manifold when SMS messages travel
between different mobile network operators in different
countries.
3 Security Usability Considerations
Security systems for online banking need to provide ade-
quate security usability and should have a simple and in-
tuitive user interface. The system should not only be de-
signed to satisfy service provider requirements, but must
also satisfy user requirements, otherwise it will lead to in-
convenience and poor usability for users. With poor us-
ability and a poor user interface with regard to security,
the system will have poor security.
Usability of security is an extremely important, but still
poorly understood, element of IT security. One of the ear-
liest studies in this area is the experimental investigation
of the usability of PGP by Whitten and Tygar (Whitten &
Tygar 1998, 1999).
A set of general security usability principles was de-
fined in (Jøsang et al. 2007a,b). These principles distin-
guish between two types of user involvement with security
applications.
• A security action is when users are required to pro-
duce information and security tokens, or to trigger
some security relevant mechanism. For example,
typing and submitting a password is a security action.
• A security conclusion is when users observe and as-
sess some security relevant evidence in order to de-
rive the security state of systems. For example, ob-
serving a closed padlock on a browser, and conclud-
ing that the communication is protected by SSL is a
security conclusion.
Usability principles related to security actions and security
conclusions are described below.
1. Security Action Usability Principles
(a) The users must understand which security ac-
tions are required of them.
(b) The users must have sufficient knowledge and
the practical ability to make the correct security
action.
(c) The mental and physical load of a security ac-
tion must be tolerable.
(d) The mental and physical load of making re-
peated security actions for any practical number
of transactions must be tolerable.
2. Security Conclusion Usability Principles
(a) The user must understand the security conclu-
sion that is required for making an informed de-
cision. This means that users must understand
what is required of them to support a secure
transaction.
(b) The system must provide the user with suffi-
cient information for deriving the security con-
clusion. This means that it must be logically
possible to derive the security conclusion from
the information provided.
(c) The mental load of deriving the security con-
clusion must be tolerable.
(d) The mental load of deriving security conclu-
sions for any practical number of service access
instances must be tolerable.
While the mental load of verifying the correct amount
and destination account specified by the SMS message is
probably acceptable for a single transaction, the repeated
process of verifying the same can be quite tedious leading
to user apathy, thereby violating security usability princi-
ple 2d. It has been noted that when faced with a frustrating
security task, users may usually bypass or ignore that task
(Balfanz et al. 2004, Sasse 2003, Adams & Sasse 1999). In
order to determine the usability of such schemes an inves-
tigation was needed. The outcome of such a study is po-
tentially very important because it will determine whether
the user can be made liable for errors made when using
such systems.
In the next sections, we will describe a practical exper-
iment which simulated an online bank and test how par-
ticipants in the experiment where able to correctly use the
SMS authorization scheme for authorizing funds transfer
transactions.
4 Experiment Design
4.1 Objectives
The goal of the experiment was to examine the usability
of the SMS authentication scheme. In other words, we
investigated whether users are able to perform the extra
tasks in a satisfactory manner, and that executing these
tasks does not introduce new security vulnerabilities. It is
important to know whether users are able to fulfill these
tasks, because it tells us whether it is reasonable to make
users liable for transactions based on this security tech-
nique. Banks would normally assumed that users are re-
sponsible for transactions authorized with the authoriza-
tion code. However, if a significant proportion of users are
unable to use the method correctly, this assumption would
be unreasonable and should be reassessed by the banks.
The experiment studied customers interaction with an
online bank that uses the SMS authorization code scheme
described above. We asked participants to play the role of
customers and perform a number of financial transactions
using our simulated virtual online bank. Their reaction to
security attacks was monitored and analyzed. The analysis
would show whether it is reasonable to make customers
liable for errors made when using the system.
4.2 Ethical Considerations
The experiment was conducted during June and July 2007
at QUT (Queensland University of Technology) and in-
volved human participation. The experiment was re-
viewed and approved by the QUT Research Ethics Com-
mittee. There were no risks associated with participation
in the experiment. A Web page with a consent form was
presented to participants before starting the experiment.
Participants were asked to click a button labeled ”Partic-
ipate” to confirm their agreement to participate. The par-
ticipants’ email addresses were required as part of the ex-
periment. The participants were informed that it would be
kept confidential and would be deleted after completion of
the experiment.
4.3 Participant Recruitment
The participants were recruited by sending out invitation
emails. We obtained permissions to use several email dis-
tribution lists for sending out the invitations. The sub-
ject field in the invitation email said: ”Invitation: Online
banking security experiment”. The email body had the
following content:
The Information Security Institute at QUT is
running an experiment on the usability of online
banking security, and you are invited to partici-
pate. You will find it fun and interesting to play
with our simulated online bank. It will only take
a few minutes. We would like you to transfer
virtual money to different bank accounts imag-
ining that you are using your real bank account
and money. We hope you can make at least 10
transactions. It is important that you take the
same security precautions as you would with
your real online bank account. This means that
you should cancel any transaction where you
notice something suspicious, because it could
indicate a security attack. The list of bank ac-
counts is provided below.
For each transaction, you will do the following:
1. Start a new transaction by filling in the
”New Transaction” web page and clicking
”Submit”. You will receive an authoriza-
tion code by email.
2. Fetch the email and verify that the trans-
action details are correct.
3. Confirm the transaction in case the details
are correct. To confirm, copy the autho-
rization code from the email to the Web
page, and click ”Confirm”. Alternatively
cancel the transaction if you think there is
something wrong. To cancel, simply click
”Cancel”.
Please visit the URL below to start the experi-
ment.
http://www.isi.qut.edu.au/people/alzomaim/bank/consent.htm
List of destination accounts to be used
Destination accounts: Suggested amounts:
(only these possible) (other amounts possible)
30263142 $5000
30263155 $500
30263157 $5500
30263143 $55000
30263158 $50000
30263145 $4400
30263149 $44000
30263150 $440
30263144 $44400
30263156 $400
We ask you to execute at least 10 transactions.
Multiple transfers to the same account are pos-
sible.
Thank you,
Note: Approval from the QUT ethics committee
has been obtained. Your email address will be
kept confidential and will be deleted after com-
pletion of the experiment.
Other participants were recruited by personal contact pro-
viding them with a hard copy of a document identical to
the above email.
5 System Design
We developed the simulated online bank and asked partic-
ipants to execute a number of financial transactions. Some
of the transactions were corrupted to simulate attacks. The
transaction records showed whether participants were able
to notice the attacks and cancel these transactions.
We expected that the average participant would not
be willing to provide us with their mobile phone num-
bers. Email messages provides the same functionality
as SMS messages for the purpose of transaction autho-
risation. Also, we were not interested in investigating
the technical security aspects of SMS based authorization.
For these reasons we decided to base the authorization of
transactions on email messages instead of SMS messages.
We developed a real Web system that simulated a vir-
tual online bank consisting of two parts, the server front
end that provides the http interface, and the server back
end that handles the database (see Fig.3).
Both the front end and the back end were implemented
using PHP (a programming language designed to build dy-
namic websites). The Bank database at the back end was
a relational database designed, implemented and accessed
using the MySQL relational database system.
5.1 Server Front End
The server front end was hosted on the Internet server
of the Information Security Institute (ISI) at Queensland
University of Technology (QUT). This server presented
the simulated online bank interface where users could ex-
ecute financial transactions. The user interface consisted
of two web pages entitled “New transaction web page”
and “Confirmation web page” that are described in more
details below.
5.1.1 New Transaction Web Page
The “New Transaction” web page (see Fig.4) allowed
users to initiate new transactions. The web page was de-
signed to do the following functions:
• Display the web page content in the browser window
allowing users to enter transaction information.
• Validate entered data format which included account
number, amount and email address.
• Send entered transaction information to the bank
server.
This page contained the following fields:
• Destination Account: An eight digit destination ac-
count number.
• Amount: Amount to be transferred
• E-Mail address: Where the authorization code is to
be sent.
A ’Submit’ button triggered the transfer of the entered in-
formation to the virtual bank server and took the user to
the Confirmation Web Page.
5.1.2 Confirmation Web Page
The ’Confirmation’ web page (see Fig.5) allowed users
to confirm and complete an initiated transaction. It was
designed to do the following:
Figure 3: Simulated Online bank Model
Figure 4: New Transaction Web Page
• Display the web page content in the browser window
allowing users to enter the authorization code.
• Send the entered authorization code to the bank
server.
• Display the transaction confirmation information.
Figure 5: Confirmation Web Page
The page displayed the transaction information and
contained a single field for the authorization code to be
entered. The page contained a ’Confirm’ button used to
confirm the transaction by sending the authorization code
to the virtual bank server and a button labeled ’Cancel’
to cancel the transaction. If the user chose to confirm the
transaction, a link to the ’New Transaction web page’ was
displayed allowing him or her to do another transaction.
If the user chose to cancel the transaction, two links were
displayed; one to do another transaction and another to
return the user back to the confirmation page.
5.2 Server Back End
Most of the functionality of the simulated online bank
model was executed in the server back end which was de-
signed to do the following main functions:
• Generate authorization codes in the format of six-
digit hex numbers. Each code resulted from applying
the hash function SHA12 to the transaction informa-
tion and a random number.
• Send transaction information to the ’Confirmation’
web page.
• Email the authorization code and transaction infor-
mation to the user email address.
• Verify received authorization code for a particular
transaction.
• Generate security attacks by alteration of the transac-
tion details in selected transactions.
The Bank database connected to the back end was a
relational database which was designed, implemented and
accessed using the MySQL relational database system.
All user interactions with simulated online bank when
executing financial transactions were stored in the bank
database.
5.3 Participant Tasks
Participants were provided with instructions to complete
a number of bank transactions using our simulated online
bank. To complete each transaction, each participant had
to do the following steps:
• Start a new transaction by filling the fields in the
’New Transaction’ web page and then clicking the
’Submit’ button.
• Check email sent by the virtual bank server to vali-
date transaction information and copy authorization
code.
• Complete the transaction by entering the authoriza-
tion code in the ’Confirmation’ web page and click-
ing the ’Confirm’ button or alternatively cancel the
transaction by clicking the ’Cancel’ button.
2Secure Hash Algorithm. A function that produces a fixed-length digital repre-
sentation (known as a digest) of an input data sequence of any length.
We provided participants with a list of acceptable destina-
tion accounts and suggested amounts to be used. We also
asked participants to complete at least 10 transactions. All
transactions and data collected from user interactions with
this experiment were recorded and stored in the database
on the server back end side. The scenario of the experi-
ment is illustrated in Fig.6 and Table 2.
Figure 6: Authorising bank transactions via Email
Step ♯ Description
1 Present ’New Transaction’ Web page.
2 Enter transaction information.
3 Transmit transaction information.
4 Generate authorisation code.
5 Email trans. info and authorisation code.
6 Transmit Confirmation Web page.
7 Present Confirmation Web page.
8 Verify received transaction information.
9 Enter authorisation code/cancel transaction.
10 Transmit authorisation code.
11 Verify authorisation code.
12 Transmit transaction confirmation
13 Present transaction confirmation
Table 2: Virtual online bank scenario
5.4 Simulated Security Attacks
Transaction authorization with SMS messages has been
introduced by online banks in response to various security
attacks such as phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks.
While technically elegant, it puts extra cognitive burden
on users because they have to handle two devices, and re-
late information between them. In the experiment, sim-
ulated attacks were executed during online bank transac-
tions, and we observed whether users were able to notice
that they were being attacked.
To conduct the test, we asked participants to execute
a number of financial transactions. Some of those trans-
actions were attacked by alteration of the destination ac-
count. The destination account was altered after the par-
ticipant had submitted the initial transaction request. This
resulted in an email containing the altered transaction in-
formation together with authorization code being sent to
the participant’s email address.
We implemented two types of security attacks; the
”obvious attack” which was easy to discover, and the
”stealthy attack” which was difficult to discover.
• Obvious Attack Type
The obvious attack was designed so that it would be
easy for participants to notice the alteration in the
transaction details. This was done by altering five
out of eight digits of the destination account number.
• Stealthy Attack Type
The stealthy attack was designed such that it would
be difficult for participants to notice the alteration in
the transaction details. This was done by altering
only one digit in the destination account number.
By observing whether participants canceled the at-
tacked transactions we could determine whether partici-
pants noticed the obvious and the stealthy alterations to
the destination account number.
5.5 Phase Shift of Attacks
To execute our security attacks equally over transactions,
we assigned an attack phase to each participant in the
following manner: Participant nr. 1 was assigned attack
phase 1, participant nr. 2 was assigned attack phase 2, etc.
until the tenth participant was assigned attack phase 10.
Then participant nr. 11 was assigned attack phase 1 and
so on.
Attack phases determined when the stealthy attack was
going to occur. For example, if attack phase for a particu-
lar participant was 7, then the stealthy attack would occur
on the seventh transaction for that particular participant.
The obvious attack occurs on a transaction number calcu-
lated by ((attack phase + 5) mod 10). For example, if a
participant was assigned an attack phase 7, then the ob-
vious attack would occur on his or her second transaction
(i.e. (7 + 5) mod 10 = 2).
Participants with attack phases 1-5 would face stealthy
attack first while those with attack phases 6-10 would face
obvious attack first. Table 3 shows when both types of
attacks would occur for each attack phase.
Phase Transaction # attacked
shift Stealthy Obvious
P.s. 1 #1 #6
P.s. 2 #2 #7
P.s. 3 #3 #8
P.s. 4 #4 #9
P.s. 5 #5 #10
P.s. 6 #6 #1
P.s. 7 #7 #2
P.s. 8 #8 #3
P.s. 9 #9 #4
P.s.10 #10 #5
Table 3: Phase shift of attacks
6 Participant Demographics
The majority of participants in the experiment were staff
and students at Queensland University of Technology. The
participant recruitment process was to send a participation
invitation email to a certain distribution list and start re-
ceiving responses from participants and collecting data.
After a period when no new participants had been ob-
served, another email to another distribution list was sent
out and so on.
From the recruitment procedure we followed, we can
classify participants into the following groups:
• QUT Participants
– 10 participants (11%) were PhD research stu-
dents at Information Security Institute (ISI).
– 5 participants (5%) were staff at the Faculty of
Information Technology.
– 58 participants (64%) were undergraduate and
master students at the Faculty of Information
Technology.
– 5 participants (5%) were students at the Faculty
of Education.
– 4 participants (4%) were researchers at Faculty
of Law.
• Non-QUT Participants 10 non-QUT participants
(11%) were contacted personally and non of them has
a degree in Information Technology.
The actual number of people responded to our invi-
tation email and started working on the experiment
was 116, but 24 participants were excluded for dif-
ferent reasons:
– 3 participants with invalid email addresses.
– 12 participants executed few transactions with-
out being attacked.
– 9 participants initiated transactions but never
completed the confirmation process. We no-
ticed that some email servers, like HOTMAIL,
directed our invitation email to a spam folder.
Fig.7 summarizes the participant demographics.
Figure 7: Participant Demographics
7 Results
As a result of the experiment, 92 participants executed a
total of 734 transactions. When a participant interacted
with the system, each transaction could be in one of two
states:
1. An initiated transaction which was a funds trans-
fer transaction a participant had started but not con-
firmed.
2. A complete transaction which was a financial trans-
action a participant had started and confirmed.
We classified experiment transactions into the following:
• Normal transaction: This was a completed normal
unaltered transaction.
• Incomplete or error transaction: This was a normal
unaltered transaction that participant initiated but did
not complete.
• Successfully attacked transaction: This was a com-
pleted transaction where the participant failed to no-
tice the altered destination account number.
• Unsuccessfully attacked transactions (avoided at-
tack): This was an altered transaction that was can-
celed by the participant.
There were 557 normal transactions, 49 incomplete trans-
actions and 128 attacked transactions where 57 transac-
tions were successfully attacked and 71 transactions were
unsuccessfully attacked. See Table 4, Table 5 and Fig.8.
Transaction type Count
Normal 557
Incomplete 49
Successful attacks 57
Avoided attacks 71
Total 734
Table 4: Overview of recorded transactions
Attack type Avoided Successful Total
Obvious 42 11 53
Stealthy 29 46 75
Total 71 57 128
Table 5: Overall attack response
Figure 8: Overall attack response
7.1 Observations of Obvious Attacks
The total number of transactions attacked by the obvious
attack was 53. Participants were able to discover and can-
cel 42 attacked transactions of this type. This means that
participants were able to avoid 79% of the obvious attacks.
Only 11 out of 53 attacked transactions of this type were
successful, which translated into 21% successful obvious
attacks. See Table 5 and Fig.8.
7.2 Observations of Stealthy Attacks
The total number of transactions attacked by the stealthy
attack was 75. Participants were able to discover and can-
cel only 29 attacked transactions of this type. This means
that participants were able to avoid 39% of the stealthy
attacks. 46 out 75 attacked transactions of this type were
successful which translates into 61% successful stealthy
attacks. See Table 5 and Fig.8.
7.3 Attack Phases and Attack Type
Some of our participants had been attacked first by obvi-
ous attack while others faced the stealthy attack first. We
found out the number of successful and avoided attacks
varied depending on which type of attack occurred first.
With obvious attack occurring first, the number of suc-
cessful obvious attack was 9 out of 32 while there were
17 out of 29 successful stealthy attacks. See Table 6 and
Fig.9.
Attack type Avoided Successful Total
Obvious 23 9 32
Stealthy 12 17 29
Total 35 26 61
Table 6: Obvious attack first
Figure 9: Obvious attack first
On the other hand, when stealthy attack occurred first
the number of successful stealthy attack was 29 out of 46
and the number of successful obvious attacks was 2 out of
21. See Table 7 and Fig.10.
Attack type Avoided Successful Total
Obvious 19 2 21
Stealthy 17 29 46
Total 36 31 67
Table 7: Stealthy attack first
8 Discussion
The observations show that a significant proportion of
users are unable to detect the attacks. As predicted, the
obvious attacks were detected more frequently than the
stealthy attacks. The detection rate of stealthy attacks de-
pends to a certain degree on whether it was preceded by
an obvious attack or not.
An interesting observation is that attacks are avoided
significantly more often when occurring late in the users
experience with the online bank.
For example obvious attacks were avoided in 72% of
cases when occurring before stealthy attacks, and in 90%
of the cases when occurring after stealthy attacks.
Similarly, stealthy attacks were avoided in 37% of the
cases when occurring before obvious attacks, and in 41%
of the cases when occurring after obvious attacks.
A possible explanation for this trend can be that users
need to get a degree of experience with the system before
Figure 10: Stealthy attack first
they become sufficiently alert to detect and avoid attacks.
In other words, it is possible that the novelty of the systems
has the effect of diverting peoples attention.
It can be assumed that realistic attacks will require al-
teration of about half the digits in the destination account
number, which translates into our obvious attacks. We
will therefore base the discussion of security on the ob-
served statistics of obvious attacks. Disregarding the order
in which obvious and stealthy attacks occurred, it is wor-
risome to observe that obvious attacks were successful in
21% of the cases in general. The conclusion to be drawn
from this, which is also the main conclusion of the exper-
iment, is that this system is very insecure against attacks
where the amount and destination account are changed in
the authorization message. It is easy to imagine attack
scenarios where this could happen.
8.1 Trojan Attack Scenario
Attackers can send out spam email which invites users to
access a website that will install a Trojan on users client
computer. This Trojan will observe activities on the client
computer and get into action when the user starts an on-
line bank session. When the user specifies a funds trans-
fer transaction, the Trojan will alter the amount and des-
tination account without displaying the alteration on the
screen. The online bank will thus receive a transaction re-
quest with the false amount and destination account. Even
when the transaction requires authorization via an SMS
message, a significant percentage of users will fail to no-
tice that the transaction details have been altered.
8.2 Man-In-the-Middle Attack Scenario
It is possible for an attacker to intercept the communica-
tion between the customer and the bank server and im-
personate them both. The attacker could trick the cus-
tomer into logging into the attacker’s website, and mas-
querade as the real bank. This can for example hap-
pen through the attack commonly known as pharming
(Berghel 2006, Madsen et al. 2005). This consists of
poisoning the DNS3cache on the client terminal or local
broadband router, so that the domain name of the gen-
uine online bank corresponds to the IP address of the at-
tacker’s server in the poisoned DNS cache. With a poi-
soned DNS, the browser will connect to the attacker’s
server even though the customer manually types the cor-
rect domain name of the bank. DNS poisoning can easily
be executed by luring the customer to access a malicious
3Domain Name Server
website loaded with JavaScripts and JavaApplets (Stamm
et al. 2006, Tsow et al. 2006).
By obtaining customer’s authentication details, the at-
tacker can login to the legitimate bank website and act
as a man-in-the-middle between the customer and the on-
line bank. When the customer sends a transfer transac-
tion request to the attacker website, the attacker can relay
the similar altered transaction request (i.e. by changing
the destination account number) to the real online bank.
Upon receiving the altered transaction request, the online
bank will then send an SMS message containing the au-
thorization code and the false transaction details to the
customer. Our observation shows that a considerable per-
centage of customers will not notice the alteration and will
complete the confirmation process by sending the autho-
rization code to the attacker; in this case, the attacker can
relays the received authorisation code to the bank which
will execute the altered transaction. The attack has suc-
ceeded!
9 Conclusion
The transaction authorization method based on SMS mes-
sages was introduced by banks in response to the now tra-
ditional phishing attacks, and this method is indeed effec-
tive in stopping such attacks. Unfortunately, it is expected
that it is only a matter of time before the attacks get more
sophisticated, such as for example through smart Trojans
installed on the users client computers or through Man-In-
the-Middle attacks.
It is worth considering that participants in our experi-
ment may be less motivated to behave securely than they
would in real life when dealing with actual bank accounts.
From the point of view of the participants, there is no risk
attached with performing the experiment whereas there
are real risks involved in conducting transactions through
their online bank. Actually, it would be impossible to cre-
ate an environment with real risk so this was an unavoid-
able limitation in our experiment. However, our study has
given a strong indication that the SMS transaction autho-
rization method will be relatively vulnerable to the attacks
we have described. According to our observations only
about 79% of users would be able to avoid realistic attacks,
which in our opinion represents an inadequate level of se-
curity for online banking. We predict that online banks
will need to develop improved methods for ensuring the
security and integrity of online banking when such attacks
start occurring.
The security problem caused by the failure to notice
that transaction details have been altered has more to do
with usability than with technical security. A possible so-
lution should therefore be based on an improvement in us-
ability, and not necessarily on improving security mech-
anisms. However, it is beyond the scope of this study
to propose a possible solution to the discovered security
problem.
There will always be a trade-off between different
goals when designing identity management solutions, and
it is natural that the service and infrastructure providers
will promote solutions that are cost effective relative to
the assumed risk. However, as the threat picture changes,
the solutions need to be adapted. We hope that this study
will allow online banks and other online service providers
to be better prepared for emerging risks.
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